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Abstract— Vehicular Communication (VC) systems are on the
verge of practical deployment. Nonetheless, their security and
privacy protection is one of the problems that have been tackled
only recently. In order to show the feasibility of secure VC,
implementations are required. In [8] we have discussed the design
of a VC security system that has emerged as a result of the
European SeVeCom project. In this second paper, we discuss
various issues related to the implementation and deployment
aspects of secure VC systems. Moreover, we provide an outlook
on open security research issues, which will arise as VC systems
develop from today’s simple prototypes to full-fledged systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular communication (VC) systems will enable many
exciting applications that will make driving safer, more ef-
ficient and more comfortable. But this necessitates the in-
troduction of security and privacy enhancing mechanisms, as
discussed in [8]. In this paper we focus on practical aspects
associated with the implementation and deployment of such
a secure VC system. We also provide an outlook to future
research challenges.
First, we motivate why the deployment of a security system
for a vehicular environment is different compared to other
common information technology systems. We then present
the SeVeCom baseline architecture, and highlight various
implementation- and deployment-specific aspects such as:
flexible integration in existing communication stacks, use of a
hardware security module, and secure connections of VC on-
board units to in-vehicle bus systems. Furthermore, we analyze
performance and communication overhead of the suggested
security mechanisms and propose optimizations for efficient
secure communication.
Finally, we present selected topics we consider relevant for
future research on VC system security. One aspect is the use
of complex forms of data dissemination, such as aggregation
schemes, which require different security approaches than the
ones used for broadcast and unicast communications. Another
aspect is the integration of VC systems with other networks or
connecting them with mobile commodity devices, which raise
additional security problems. Other future research aspects
include secure localization and the question whether existing
VC privacy solutions are indeed sufficient.
II. VEHICULAR COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
There are significant differences between devices such as
mobile phones or desktop computers connected to the Internet
and devices in a VC system. Differences in development,
production, and operation, determine VC-specific constraints
and conditions:
1) Vehicles have a long life span, lasting several years
in most cases. This makes it hard to change on-board
systems as reaction to new upcoming risks to the vehicle
safety.
2) Owners have constant physical access to and full control
over vehicles. In spite of the involved safety risks,
many users might try to modify or “enhance” their
vehicles. From a manufacturer’s point of view, the risk
of hardware tampering cannot be neglected.
3) No technical expertise on vehicle electronics or VC
security aspects is expected from a user that runs a
vehicle. Hence, the vehicular security measures have to
operate autonomously with no need for intervention or
feedback from the user.
4) Robustness requirements and time constraints are de-
manding. Functions necessary, for example, for driving
or alerts received via the VC system must be processed
in real-time: delays or errors could lead to vehicle mal-
functions, driving errors, and consequently to physical
damages and injuries.
5) Liability and conformance require precise formulation
of legal issues. Differing regulations and requirements in
various countries make it even more difficult to address
these challenges.
These observations have consequences on the implementa-
tion of a VC security system. Due to the long vehicle life
cycle, it cannot be ensured that all threats are thwarted at the
time of development. Therefore, the VC security mechanisms
should be flexible, adaptable, and extensible, to allow later
adjustments to changing security requirements. To address this
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2need, we propose a component-based security architecture for
VC systems, which allows to add, replace, and reconfigure
components (for example, substitute cryptographic algorithms)
throughout the life cycle of the vehicle.
The large number and the variety of vehicles have to
be taken into account. Even for a single car type, different
production and equipment lines lead to many distinct versions
and variants. Nonetheless, it should be possible to integrate
a security system into all those platforms. In addition, the
communication stack and security measures might be designed
by different teams or vendors; a situation that clearly requires
well-defined but still flexible interfaces. These reasons led
to the development of the so called “hooking architecture”,
which introduces special hooks at the interface between every
layer of the vehicular communication system. The hooking
architecture introduces an event-callback mechanism into the
communication stack which allows adding security measures
without the need to change the entire communication system.
The security system in a vehicle has to fulfill real-time or
near real-time requirements. For the underlying cryptographic
primitives, this implies optimized cryptographic hardware,
in order to guarantee the near real-time performance. The
potential trade-off between security and performance has to
be well balanced.
To enable VC systems to withstand future, yet unknown
attacks, besides the traditional prevention-oriented approach,
functionalities to detect attacks, such as intrusion detection
capabilities, and to recover after an attack, are needed. In the
long run, the goal is to enhance the resilience of the system.
III. SEVECOM IMPLEMENTATION
The SeVeCom project defines a baseline security archi-
tecture for VC systems [15]. Based on a set of design
principles, SeVeCom defines an architecture that comprises
different modules, each addressing certain security and privacy
aspects. Modules contain components implementing one part
of system functionality. The baseline specification provides
one instantiation of the baseline architecture, building on well-
established mechanisms and cryptographic primitives, thus
being easy to implement and to deploy in upcoming VC
systems.
A. Baseline Architecture: Deployment View
The SeVeCom baseline architecture addresses different as-
pects, such as secure communication protocols, privacy protec-
tion, and in-vehicle security. As the design and development of
VC protocols, system architectures, and security mechanisms
is an ongoing process, only few parts of the overall system are
yet finished or standardized. As a result, a VC security system
cannot be based on a fixed platform but instead has to be
flexible, with the possibility to adapt to future VC applications
or new VC technologies.
To achieve the required flexibility, the SeVeCom baseline
architecture consists of modules, which are responsible for
a certain system aspect, such as identity management. The
modules, in turn, are composed of multiple components each
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Fig. 1. Baseline Architecture: Deployment View.
handling a specific task. For instance, the Secure Communi-
cation Module is responsible for implementing protocols for
secure communication and consists of several components,
each of them implementing a single protocol. Components are
instantiated only when their use is required by certain appli-
cations, and they use well-defined interfaces to communicate
with other components. Thus, they can be exchanged by more
recent versions, without other modules being affected.
As shown in Fig. 1, the Security Manager is the central
part of the SeVeCom system architecture. It instantiates and
configures the components of all other security modules and
establishes the connection to the Cryptographic Support Mod-
ule. To cope with different situations, the Security Manager
maintains different policy sets. Policies can enable or disable
some of the components or adjust their configuration, for
example, to enhance or relax the parameters for a pseudonym
change under certain circumstances.
B. Communication Stack Integration
To be independent of the actual communication stack, the
integration of the SeVeCom security system into the protocol
stack is based on a hooking concept, inspired by similar
architectures such as the Linux Netfilter kernel subsystem.
Inter Layer Proxies (ILPs) are inserted at several points in the
communication stack. Every ILP maintains a list of callback
handlers that are to be notified of certain events.
During initialization, the SeVeCom components can register
at an ILP, subscribing for certain message types and direction
(up or down the stack). Therefore, they have to implement an
event listener interface and use the registerHandler() method
to connect to an ILP. Some components may have to register at
multiple ILPs, subscribing for different kinds of packets. When
a message arrives at an ILP, an event callback is triggered for
all components that have registered for this message type and
their eventHander() method is called. The callback includes a
reference to the received message, and the component is then
able to inspect or modify it. By the return value the component
indicates if the message was modified, if it should be reinserted
into the stack, or if it should be simply dropped by the ILP.
3The Secure Beaconing Component, for example, connects to
the ILP above the MAC layer and checks the signatures of all
incoming beacon messages. Beacons with invalid signatures
are either discarded or tagged. Using this hooking architecture,
it is possible to transparently integrate security functionality
into an existing network stack with minimal modifications.
Whereas events are triggered by the communication stack,
the security system can also access the stack by means of
command calls using a well-defined API offered by stack
layers. Command calls could, e.g. instruct the MAC layer to
set its MAC address to that of a new pseudonym.
The hooking concept makes certain assumptions about
the network stack. It assumes a layered architecture, where
the ILPs can be inserted in between, and the stack has to
implement a certain command API, e.g. for change of MAC
addresses. To be able to port the SeVeCom architecture to
many different communication platforms, we also provide
an additional convergence layer: This defines an abstraction
interface that proxies call between the communication system
and the security components. Whenever the SeVeCom system
is ported to a new platform, besides adapting to different
packet formats, only the ILPs and the convergence layer have
to be modified, while all other components remain unaffected
both in terms of security and communication.
C. Hardware Security Module
As explained in [8], the purpose of the Hardware Security
Module (HSM) is to provide a physically protected environ-
ment for the storage of private keys and for the execution of
cryptographic operations using them. Clearly, the full imple-
mentation of a HSM is beyond the scope of the SeVeCom
Project, but we can summarize the main requirements that
such an implementation should meet in order to be applicable
for securing vehicle communication systems.
First of all, the HSM must be tamper resistant, to some
extent. High-end tamper resistant modules (such as the IBM
4758 Cryptographic Coprocessor) are too expensive to be
added to every vehicle. At the same time, we observe that
low-end tamper resistant devices (such as smart cards) do
not provide all the functionality that we need. In particular,
commercially available low-end devices do not have built-in
batteries, and consequently, cannot provide a trusted internal
clock. As pointed out in [9], without a trusted source of time,
such devices are not able to produce time-stamps that can
be trusted by other participants of the system. Therefore, we
need an HSM implementation somewhere between high-end
and low-end devices. A potential approach is to implement
the HSM as an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC)
with some special coating that provides a certain level of
tamper resistance. Such a customized device can provide all
the necessary functionality by design and it can be produced
in large quantity at sufficiently low costs.
Second, the HSM must have an API, through which it
can provide services to the other modules of the security
architecture that run on the OBU. This API should support
the digital signature and timestamping service, the decryption
service, as well as the key and device management services
described in [8]. We specified such an API in the SeVeCom
Project, however, lacking the appropriate HSM hardware, we
only implemented it in the form of a software library running
on a general purpose computer. Nevertheless, besides being
useful for demonstration purposes, our implementation can
also serve as a reference for future implementations on real
HSM devices. In our implementation, we used ECDSA for
digital signature generation, ECIES with HMAC-SHA1 and
AES-CBC for encryption, and we fully implemented the key
management services of the HSM described in [8].
Finally, we note that some examples published in [2] show
that physically secure modules can successfully be attacked
through their weakly designed API. For this reason, we used
formal verification techniques to verify the SeVeCom HSM
API. Our method is based on the applied pi-calculus and an
automated verification tool called ProVerif. We proved that a
key generated by an adversary cannot be implanted as a new
root key in the HSM through the API. Additionally, short-term
and long-term private keys are proved not to be revealed as
the result of possible series of function calls.
D. In-Vehicle Security
In order to achieve their full potential, VC systems need
access to the in-car network and sensors that observe the
current status of the vehicle and the environment. This enables
the VC system to process signals such as emergency braking,
airbag activation, and slippery road detection, thus greatly
contributing to the avoidance of accidents and improvement
of road safety.
On-board system signals are transferred inside the car
through different networks and domains. Usually, the network
architecture and the in-car gateways restrict the signals to
the defined network segments and prevent information from
leaving its dedicated domains. This clear architecture and
strict separation is one measure that ensures the entire vehicle,
especially its vital functions (brakes, engine or airbag control),
always operate reliably and cannot be attacked from the out-
side. If this were to be changed into a more open architecture,
for example, allowing reading out sensor information from
in-vehicle networks or displaying and reacting to warning
messages from external sources, it would be absolutely neces-
sary to ensure that in-vehicle systems are protected from any
external malicious influence.
The In-vehicle Security Module protects the interface be-
tween the in-car networks and the wireless communication
system. It controls external access to the in-car networks,
on-board control units and vehicle sensor data, but it also
ensures that data and services required by other V2V and
V2I applications are provided correctly. Within the in-vehicle
security module, two main components are provided: (i) A
firewall that controls the data flow from external applications
to the vehicle and backwards, and (ii) an Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) that constantly monitors the status of the in-car
systems and provides real-time detection of attacks.
The firewall realizes a packet or application based firewall
approach. Its rule-based table states which application is
allowed to access each kind of data or service. The IDS can
4dynamically add rules to the firewall table, in order to deny
access for a specific application or disable a service.
The IDS is based on an anomaly detection approach,
which implies that normal on-board system behavior is clearly
defined and specified. If an event results in an on-board system
state that is not part of the standard specification, a potentially
dangerous situation is detected. Depending on the source and
type of the event, appropriate reactions are taken to get the
system back to a secure and safe state.
IV. PERFORMANCE ISSUES
One very important aspect towards deployment is perfor-
mance. Given cost constraints in today’s car manufacturing,
one cannot equip vehicles with state-of-the-art desktop proces-
sors. Instead, cheap and energy-saving embedded processors
are used. At the same time, cryptographic operations to secure
VC[8] create a significant overhead both in terms of processing
and communication bandwidth.
This is especially true because beaconing is a fundamental
VC protocol: Vehicles frequently send information (e.g., po-
sition and environment conditions), typically one beacon per
100 milliseconds. At these rates, the security overhead will be
significant. Without ignoring other factors, the computational
security overhead is due to generation and verification of
packet signatures and certificates. The communication security
overhead is due to signatures and certificates attached to
packets. Each safety beacon has to be signed, and each vehicle
has to validate, for example, every 100 milliseconds, beacons
from all neighboring vehicles in range, which, not to forget,
may also change their identity (pseudonym) in the meantime.
While RSA and DSA signatures have long been indus-
try standards, these mechanisms do not meet the overhead
requirements both in terms of processing and bandwidth.
Especially in combination with large X.509v3 certificates, they
are unsuitable for high-speed and low-overhead VC systems.
In contrast, for the same security levels Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography (ECC), that is, ECC signatures, keys, and certificates,
are significantly smaller than their RSA and DSA counterparts.
This is the reason why SeVeCom as well the IEEE 1609.2
trial standard chose to utilize EC-DSA signatures. In addition,
SeVeCom utilizes compact certificates.
To reduce overhead, [4], [10] propose to not attach cer-
tificates to all messages, but rather do that for one every α
successive beacons; they also propose certificate caching to
reduce verification processing overhead. Additional optimiza-
tions are proposed in [6]: Omitting signatures or signature
verifications in certain situations, and avoiding attaching cer-
tificates based on the context, that is, unless a change in the
vehicle neighborhood takes place.
Such overhead can affect VC applications in multiple ways.
An investigation on safety applications is provided by [4],
[10]. The first dimension of the problem is communication
reliability: increased beacon size contributes to interference.
In principle, the higher the offered load, with the number of
transmitters in the area, the beaconing rate, and the message
overhead, the worse the channel performance.
The second dimension is processing overhead: Each receiver
V must in principle verify a signature for each received packet,
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Fig. 2. Performance Results: Beacon Certificate Omissions.
while signature generation is not as critical (in general, V signs
one and verifies N messages per time slot). Simulations in [10]
show that V’s CPU is heavily stressed in situations with dense
topologies, for example, in congested multi-lane highways,
even if the vehicle direction is used to avoid processing
messages from vehicles on the opposite flow.
These findings assume hardware for on-board units that
are used for current VC prototypes; in upcoming field-trials
OBUs are expected to have less powerful hardware like a
Power PC CPU at 400 MHz [7]. Initial products presumably
will be equipped similarly. Actual crypto performance of this
hardware depends very much on implementation (e.g. if pre-
calculated tables are used), but assuming efficient software
libraries and ECDSA-224, we estimate that this hardware will
not be able to process more than a few dozens of verifications
per second. Dedicated ASICs are expected to be able to handle
the required cryptographic load at moderate costs [1].
By integrating optimization mechanisms to pseudonymous
authentication, as those of[4], [10], [6], we introduce ad-
ditional verification delays: Safety warnings can be trusted
only if the corresponding short-term certified public key
(pseudonym) was previously verified. It turns out that the
overall impact of security on this front can be kept low, with
the number of crashes experienced in a platoon of vehicles is
close to that achieved without any security mechanism [4],
[10]. An additional mechanism of repeatedly attaching a
certificate to β successive beacons when a pseudonym change
takes place can increase reliability. We note however that the
performance of safety applications is heavily influenced by
other parameters, like the placement of vehicles, the beaconing
rate and the penetration rate of vehicular communication.
Based on the optimizations discussed above, Fig. 2 shows
the fraction of beacon messages with attached certificates in
various scenarios and several beaconing intervals. Certificates
are attached to only beacons if new neighbors are discovered.
The result is that certificates can be omitted in more than 90%
of all sent beacons for small beacon intervals and medium
node density. Fig. 3 shows the impact of security on safety for
an emergency braking notification application in a challenging,
dense fast-moving network: with 1/α the fraction of omitted
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certificates and β the number of repetitions upon pseudonym
change, the effectiveness of unsecured VC is practically the
same as that of secure VC.
V. RESEARCH CHALLENGES
We consider our VC security solution, described here and
in [8], as mature and practically deployable. Nonetheless, there
are open issues that cannot be handled by existing security
strategies alone, thus calling for new approaches. We highlight
those, present initial results, and raise questions towards future
research.
A. Alternative Communication Forms
On-going research has mostly considered VC protocols re-
lying on periodic beaconing, flooding, GeoCast, and position-
based routing. Up to now, these mechanisms have received the
attention of work on VC security and privacy. Nonetheless,
recently, additional means of information dissemination have
been considered in the context of VC. For example, the
literature highlights the need for more efficient flooding and
GeoCast strategies, and suggests the use of Gossiping or
Context-adaptive Message Dissemination, as well as Data
Aggregation in VC systems [13].
These new approaches will necessitate an adaptation of
security and privacy strategies. Mechanisms such as Context-
adaptive Message Dissemination already provide an inherent
degree of resistance against attacks [14]. In contrast to many
routing protocols, where the protocol itself can become the
target of an attacker, there is (nearly) no signaling between
nodes that an attacker could exploit.
Another aspect that brings forth new security issues is the
need for nodes that relay messages to also modify them. This
has been already the case for position-based forwarding we
discussed in [8]. But this is even more so for Context-adaptive
Message Dissemination and Data Aggregation. In the latter
case, individual information contributed by vehicles usually
becomes unavailable during the dissemination process.
Misbehavior, including injection of erroneous data and
denial of service (DoS), is still possible, even if strong
cryptographic security is present. Mechanisms that perform
consistency checks, using redundant information or on-board
sensors, can be used to discard incorrect information from
the network. Meanwhile, rate limits can confine the effects
of DoS attacks. Initial exploration of such mechanisms has
already delivered promising results [14].
B. Data-centric Trust
We observe that the trustworthiness of messages sent by
a node (vehicle or RSU) is primarily determined by the
trustworthiness of the sender’s credentials. Essentially, the VC
system entities, CAs and nodes, make statements on public
keys, identities, and attributes, and data and VC messages
respectively. Then, at any point in time, messages from any
newly encountered car are trusted as long as its certificate is
valid. Such trust relations, entity-centric and set a priori, are
useful, but they lack the flexibility that is necessary for highly
volatile and data-centric VC systems.
Given the majority of VC applications, it becomes clear
that it is often more useful to assess the trustworthiness of
data per se, rather than assessing only the trustworthiness
of the nodes that report them. The need for data-centric
trust establishment is clearer if we consider that identities
of nodes are largely irrelevant, even if no privacy enhancing
mechanisms are employed. In contrast, it is the data (e.g.,
safety warnings, traffic information) and their freshness and
location relevance that matter the most. From another point of
view, trying to interact with possibly adversarial (faulty) data
senders to determine their trustworthiness is hard: encounters
are in general short-lived and with no prior association.
Considering more generally the issue of non-cryptographic
protection mechanisms, it is possible to rely on own or trusted
measurements, for example, as discussed in [8] for securing
GeoCast, or in the previous section for context-aware data
dissemination, to discard erroneous data. But data may come
from relatively remote sources. More important, the receiving
node will be unable to determine their trustworthiness alone.
So a cooperative management of data-centric trust is needed.
Beyond what is presented in [12], further development of
techniques to achieve data-centric trust establishment will be
needed.
C. Secure Localization
Location information is critical for VC systems, especially
for cooperative awareness, collision avoidance, and essentially
all safety applications, as well as for position-based infor-
mation dissemination. An internal adversary could announce
false own positions, while an input-controlling adversary [8]
could affect the position announced by its victims, and this
way disrupt or abuse the VC operation. Whereas an internal
adversary could be thwarted by data consistency checking and
position verification, these methods cannot be effective against
an input-controlling attacker that attacks the Global Navigation
Satellite Systems (GNSS).
6The objective of the adversary is to manipulate the location
GNSS receivers compute, for example, for the Global Position-
ing System (GPS). To do so, the adversary can interfere with
GNSS transmissions and inject forged navigation messages.
A variant of such attacks, termed replay attacks, is possible
even if GNSS were cryptographically protected. In fact, replay
attacks can be fine-grained, so that gradual manipulation
of each victim location can remain small and thus hard to
detect. But, cumulatively, they can lead to substantial distances
between the actual and the perceived (provided by the GNSS)
location of the victim nodes [11]. Equally interesting, such
attacks are possible without any compromise, physical or not,
of the GNSS receiver or other on-board equipment or software.
This leads to an important realization: location information
in the system cannot be considered by default trustworthy.
One solution would be to leverage on mechanisms as the
secure neighbor discovery and position verification discussed
in [8]. In addition, dedicated infrastructure could provide
“land-marks,” assisting the detection of false location infor-
mation. Finally, mechanisms that detect adversarial GNSS
transmissions could be devised and integrated in the GNSS
receivers or the OBUs. If so, correct nodes falling prey to an
input-controlling adversary would declare their own location
information as faulty, and thus refrain disseminating in any
messages they transmit. We believe that future efforts in those
two main directions should be undertaken.
D. Secure Integration of Commodity Devices
Devices such as portable computers, mobile phones, iPods,
or (portable) navigation systems are becoming more and more
ubiquitous. Customers wish to use these devices inside of the
vehicle, and connect them to the vehicle electronics where
meaningful. Nowadays, mobile phones and iPods can already
be connected to vehicles up to some degree. In the future,
complete and seamless integration is desired.
Portable navigation systems, for instance, could be im-
proved by transferring data from the vehicle’s rotation sensors
of the wheels and the current velocity to improve navigation
in tunnels. For the calculation of the route and the arrival time,
additional internal data, such as fuel status, could be taken into
account. If the customer were allowed to connect her mobile
computer to the vehicle network in an uncontrolled way, she
could be given the chance to check the vehicle status in detail,
and change at will settings like the engine configuration or the
visual layout of the telematic system user interface.
Every interface and connection of non-VC devices to the
in-vehicle system poses a threat and increases the risk that
malicious code or adversaries gain access to the in-vehicle
system. Wireless interfaces raise additional concerns, as ille-
gitimate access could be easier and achieved from a distance.
To prevent in-vehicle and thus VC system compromise, it
is necessary to define specific policies that describe and
devise security mechanisms that enforce parsimonious access
of commodity devices to in-vehicle resources.
E. Hybrid Vehicle Communication Systems
VC systems could be integrated with other communication
networks, such as cellular networks, WiFi networks, wireless
Fig. 4. Hybrid Vehicle Communication System.
sensor networks, and mesh networks. They could, for instance,
take advantage of the ubiquitous coverage provided by cellular
networks, especially in the initial deployment phase when
their penetration rate is expected to be low. Beyond the
obvious use of cellular data services for information download
- including security related data - the cellular infrastructure
could also be used for geo-casting traffic and safety related
information with less stringent delay requirements; systems
in this direction have been investigated for example by the
European Com2React project [5]. WiFi networks could be
used for similar purposes - at higher data rates - in urban areas
where WiFi coverage is substantial. Wireless sensor networks
deployed along hazardous roads can collect and process local
environmental information and share that with vehicles passing
by. Fig. 4 shows an example of such a hybrid VC system that
also incorporates sensor network nodes which deliver sensing
data via a base station to nearby vehicles.
In terms of security, the integration of vehicle communica-
tion systems with other communication networks requires at
least an integrated authentication infrastructure. In particular,
vehicles need to authenticate the messages that they receive
from cellular base stations, WiFi access points, and roadside
sensors before trusting and acting upon them. While the
integration with cellular networks seems to be straightforward,
by adopting the well-established security mechanisms of those
networks, the integration with WiFi and sensor networks
is more challenging. One problem is roaming across WiFi
access points, because different operators may support differ-
ent authentication methods, and even if a common method
is accepted (e.g., based on the TLS Handshake Protocol),
a large scale, international PKI needs to be available. In
case of wireless sensor networks (WSN), the challenges bear
similarities to those for VC systems, with additional problems
stemming from sensor node resource constraints and lack of
physical protection. Even if sensor nodes could authenticate
7themselves to vehicles, they could have been tampered with
and compromised, and therefore their data may not be trusted.
In fact, WiFi and WSN operators may not be trusted to the
same extent as cellular network operators, for not misusing
(e.g., sharing) sensitive for the users’ privacy transactional
data.
F. Privacy
Taking into account privacy concerns when designing vehi-
cle communication systems is important for several reasons.
First of all, privacy is a basic right of people, and we believe
that new technologies should be designed in such a way that
they make it possible to retain this right. In addition, the
protection of privacy is made mandatory by laws in many
developed countries.
For these reasons, we integrated a baseline privacy pro-
tection mechanism into our architecture based on using and
changing pseudonyms. However, the proposed pseudonym
mechanism has some limitations: It might still be possible to
fully track vehicles between pseudonym changes. Increasing
the frequency of changes can help, but it also increases the
incurred overhead. In addition, taking into account statistical
models of the traffic in a given geographical area, tracking of
vehicles is possible to some extent despite frequent pseudonym
changing and despite the potentially limited observational
capabilities of the adversary, as discussed in [3] and [8].
Hence, there is a need for new and improved privacy
protecting mechanisms that provide stronger guarantees. One
promising approach is based on group signatures, however, the
efficiency of those signature schemes must be substantially
increased before they can be deployed in practice. In the
meantime, hybrid solutions can be envisioned such as the one
proposed in [4].
Moreover, attacks against privacy may happen at any layer
of the communication stack. So far, most of the research
efforts have focused on privacy enhancing technologies in the
Medium Access Control (MAC) layer and above. However,
recent advances in radio fingerprinting techniques make it
possible to identify an RF device at the physical layer. Unfor-
tunately, attacks at the physical layer may render protection
at higher layers ineffective. Therefore, some research effort is
needed to address the problem of using radio fingerprinting
for tracking purposes.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Securing vehicular communication (VC) systems is complex
endeavor, with multiple facets and subject to several unique
constraints. We have systematically analyzed the problem at
hand, identifying pertinent threats and models for adversaries.
We considered general security requirements, and mapped
those to specific VC applications. Based on a set of design
principles, aiming at a practical system that can be readily
adopted towards deployment, we designed a comprehensive
solution, a security architecture for VC systems. We focused
on identity and credentials management, security for a variety
of communication protocols, and privacy enhancing mecha-
nisms. Furthermore, we proceeded with experimental evalua-
tions of our mechanisms, based on simulations and prototype
implementations. Our results show that with the appropriate
design secure VC systems can be practical, able to support VC
applications as effectively as unsecured VC systems would.
Moreover, our security architecture implementation could be
ported with minimal modifications to practically any platform.
With the SeVeCom project reaching its conclusion, we identi-
fied and made progress towards addressing additional research
questions. This is why we believe our system can be the basis
for the deployment of robust, user privacy-preserving, secure
VC systems.
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